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A commentary on
Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated
agents, and the future of cognitive science
by Clark, A. (in press). Behav. Brain Sci.
Recently a unified brain theory was
proposed (Friston, 2010) attempting to
explain action, perception, and learn-
ing (Friston, 2010). It is based on a
predictive brain with Bayesian updat-
ing, and Andy Clark evaluates this
approach in “Whatever Next? Predictive
Brains, Situated Agents, and the Future
of Cognitive Science.” If such a theory
exists it should incorporate multiple the-
ories applicable to brain science such as
evolutionary theory (Calvin, 1987), infor-
mation theory (Borst and Theunissen,
1999; Friston, 2010), thermodynamics
(Kirkaldy, 1965) and also provide us with
an advanced model for a better under-
standing of more philosophical issues such
as the so-called free will problem.
The free will problem is a philosophical
battle between compatibilists and incom-
patibilists. According to compatibilists like
Hobbes, Hume, James, and Dennet, free
will is not in danger if determinism
is true. Free will is perfectly compati-
ble with a deterministic working of our
universe and brain. Incompatibilists dis-
agree but differ about the conclusion to
be drawn. Hard incompatibilists such as
Spinoza and Laplace conclude that there
is no free will because determinism is
true, while soft incompatibilists like Reid,
Eccles, and Penrose believe that our free
will exists because determinism is false.
In arguing for indeterminism incompat-
ibilist libertarians often refer to fashion-
able theories such as quantum mechanics
or thermodynamics which apply stochas-
tic, non-linear models in order to describe
physical processes. Nowadays these non-
linear models are also applied to brain
processes (Ezhov and Khrennikov, 2005),
though philosophers still disagree whether
this really shows that determinism is
wrong and indeterminism or chance is suf-
ficient to decide freely.
Leaving aside this philosophical issue
whether a “free will” exists or not, the
authors propose a theoretical framework
to explain our “experience of a free will.”
This framework is based on the predic-
tive brain concept which is not entirely
new. Historically, two different models of
perception have been developed, one clas-
sical view which goes back to the philo-
sophical writings of Plato, St. Augustine,
Descartes and assumes that the brain pas-
sively absorbs sensory input, processes
this information, and reacts with a motor
and autonomic response to these passively
obtained sensory stimuli (Freeman, 2003).
In contrast, a second model of percep-
tion, which goes back to Aristotle and
Thomas Aquinas, stresses that the brain
actively looks for the information it pre-
dicts to be present in the environment,
based on an intention or goal (Freeman,
2003). The sensed information is used
to adjust the initial prediction (=prior
belief) to the reality of the environment,
resulting in a new adapted belief about
the world (posterior belief), by a mech-
anism known as Bayesian updating. The
brain hereby tries to reduce environmen-
tal uncertainty, based on the free-energy
principle (Friston, 2010). The free-energy
principle states that the brain must min-
imize its informational (=Shannonian)
free-energy, i.e., must reduce by the pro-
cess of perception its uncertainty (its
prediction errors) about its environment
(Friston, 2010). It does so by using
thermodynamic (=Gibbs) free-energy, in
other words glucose and oxygen, creat-
ing transient structure in neural networks,
thereby producing an emergent percept
or action plan (De Ridder et al., 2012)
(Figure 1A).
As completely predictable stimuli
do not reduce uncertainty (there is no
prediction error) they are not worthwhile
of conscious processing. Unpredictable
things on the other hand are not to be
ignored, because it is crucial to experience
them to update our understanding of the
environment.
From an evolutionary point of our
experience of “free will” can best be
approached by the development of flex-
ible behavioral decision making (Brembs,
2011). Predators can very easily take
advantage of deterministic flight reflexes
by predicting future prey behavior
(Catania, 2009). The opposite, i.e., ran-
dom behavior is unpredictable but highly
inefficient. Thus learning mechanisms
evolved to permit flexible behavior as a
modification of reflexive behavioral strate-
gies (Brembs, 2011). In order to do so,
not one, but multiple representations and
action patterns should be generated by the
brain, as has already been proposed by von
Helmholtz. He found the eye to be opti-
cally too poor for vision to be possible, and
suggested vision ultimately depended on
computational inference, i.e., predictions,
based on assumptions and conclusions
from incomplete data, relying on previous
experiences. The fact that multiple pre-
dictions are generated could for example
explain the Rubin vase illusion, the Necker
cube and the many other stimuli studied
in perceptual rivalry, even in monocu-
lar rivalry. Which percept or action plan is
selected is determined by which prediction
is best adapted to the environment that
is actively explored (Figure 1A). In this
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FIGURE 1 | (A) (1) Multiple predictions are generated from memory
depending on the context. (2) The environment is actively sampled/scanned
for this (3) information. (4) This turns uncertainty into certainty via the use of
glucose and oxygen, by creating patterns of functional connectivity in the
brain. (5) One percept is selected via (6) Bayesian updating/selection. Figure
modified from De Ridder et al. (2012). (B) Based on the goal or intention the
brain generates multiple possible representations of what to expect in the
environment. The representation with the smallest prediction error is
selected. However the generation of representations is constrained by what
is stored in memory and by the sampling of the environment.
sense, predictive selection of the fittest
action plan is analogous to the concept
of Darwinian selection of the fittest in
natural and sexual selection in evolution-
ary biology, as well as to the Mendelian
selection of the fittest allele in genetics
and analogous the selection of the fittest
quantum state in physics (Zurek, 2009).
Bayesian statistics can be used to select the
model with the highest updated likelihood
based on environmental new information
(Campbell, 2011). What all these mod-
els have in common is the fact that they
describe adaptive mechanisms to an ever
changing environment (Campbell, 2011).
Our evolutionary-evolved brain poten-
tial to generate multiple action plans is
constrained by what is stored in memory
and by what is present in the environ-
ment. Thus the feeling of a free will is
an illusion, as there is likely no unlim-
ited (=completely free) amount of repre-
sentations generated, due to the inherent
constraints (Figure 1B). In other words,
even though neuroscience might not be
able to determine whether “free will” in
itself really exists, it can help unravel the
mechanisms of the illusionary “experi-
ence of free will.” There are two clearly
very different kinds of illusions: those
with a physical cause and cognitive illu-
sions due to misapplication of knowledge
(Gregory, 1997). Cognitive illusions can
be related to either specific knowledge of
objects or to general knowledge embod-
ied as rules (Gregory, 1997). Some illu-
sions might result from the brain’s ten-
dency to use multisensory congruency as
a rule or mechanism for perceptual selec-
tion (van Ee et al., 2009). For exam-
ple the audio-visual McGurk effect can
explain the ventriloquist illusion (Kanaya
and Yokosawa, 2011). In a similar way it
has been proposed that phantom sound
and phantom limb illusions are related
to temporal incongruence (De Ridder
et al., 2011), and illusions induced by
stage magic involve a perceived (sim-
ple) causal sequence which differs from
the more complex real causal sequence
(Kelley, 1980).
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